Despite hammering out an agreement on container security with (arguably) America"s most important trading partner, the European Union (EU), early evidence suggested that the security clampdown demanded by the US was hugely costly for developing countries. In many cases, they (along with many richer countries) were forced to inspect every single container passing through their ports or border crossings.
Yet, against considerable odds, the World Bank (2006) reported a significant increase in the overall volume of in global trade in the five years after 9.11. One important reason was the widespread application of new technologies at ports and borders: software-run risk management systems that narrowed the focus of inspections to the highest risk containers, xray and gamma-ray screening techniques, and electronic payment of tariffs and port fees. The most improved export performer was an unlikely candidate: Serbia, which began negotiations in the mid-2000s on a Trade and Cooperation agreement with the EU, its most important export market by far.
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Despite all the recent focus on the BRIC countries -Brazil, Russia, India and Chinain research on political economy, the EU remains by some distance the world"s largest market and trader. The Union is both an economic hegemon in Europe and far beyond. It is a prime driver of globalization and remains in a far more powerful position, for a rich variety of reasons, to determine how globalization is governed than any of the BRIC countries. Europe is widely-thought to be in a state of economic decline, mostly because of crisis in the Eurozone caused by inattention to sovereign debt by small state member sttes of the Eurozone (particulary Greece and Ireland). But Europe is going nowhere, for the forseeable future, as a trading power. And although much has been written about EU trade policies, we know surprisingly little about how its trade policy is actually made.
In this volume, we argue that EU trade policy (and trade policy more generally) is in fact composed of multiple policy sub-systems. Each is characterized by a distinctive combination of three elements: perceptions about the distribution of anticipated costs and benefits, the intra-EU policy making context, and the external negotiating context. The different political dynamics to which these elements give rise in each policy sub-system produce policy outcomes that can (and often do) clash. Thus, EU trade policy is frequently incoherent. Our approach helps to explain the apparent contradictions and tensions in EU trade policy; liberal in some respects, protectionist in others. Problems of policy coherence are particularly pronounced when the EU seeks to use trade policy as a tool of its broader foreign policy, usually because the political dynamics of any specific trade instrument"s subsystem deflects or distorts any overarching political intent. Hence, our book"s title: the EU"s preoccupation with its own internal politics and policy has hampered its efforts to play a global role.
Our argument and this volume diverge substantially from the extensive and burgeoning literature on the EU"s trade policy in three main ways. First, we seek to overcome the fragmentation in the literature on the EU"s trade policy (see Young 2011) to provide a comprehensive account of policy-making across the diverse array of the EU"s explicit and implicit trade policies. Second, by making the external negotiation context a central component of our analysis, we are able to explain the EU"s (in)ability to realize its trade policy objectives.
2 Third, our approach is explicitly comparative (with the US as a reference point) and is rooted in what David Lake (2006: 762) Second, this volume contributes to the wider IPE literature on trade policy by explicitly incorporating the adoption of policies for which trade effects are only a side-effect of policies pursued for other reasons. In many economic sectors, regulatory barriers to trade that originate "behind the border" have become far more important determinants of trade policy outcomes than "at the border" barriers such as tariffs or quotas. We thus address a key weakness in the existing IPE literature, which is overwhelmingly focused on traditional trade barriers, particularly tariffs (Milner 2002: 449) .
This monograph also aims to make a contribution beyond the literature on EU trade policy by injecting insight into the growing literature on the EU as a global actor (for an overview, see Peterson 2011) . While this literature highlights the EU"s economic and trading importance as key attributes of the EU as a global actor, the literature does not engage empirically with the extent to which the EU seeks to use its trade policy instruments to advance a normative, political agenda. We lack systematic evidence about the Union"s capacity to decide to pursue such ends, or its ability to influence the behaviour of others when it seeks to do so. By beginning to answer these questions -which are just as crucial as they are unanswered -this volume aims to help to break down the "compartmentalization" of policy analyses that Knud-Erik Jørgensen (2007: 515) has identified as plaguing the literature on the EU"s external relations, creating "an archipelago of knowledge" (516). 4 We begin by explaining the significance of the EU in international trade, before highlighting a number of unexplained tensions in the Union"s trade policy. We then seek to explain why trade policy is so central to the EU, both in terms of what the EU is and what it tries to achieve internally and externally. The chapter then introduces the key policy instruments that constitute the EU"s trade policy arsenal. It concludes by setting out our argument and introducing the rest of the volume.
The centrality of the EU in international trade
By early in the 21 st century the EU had emerged as the world"s largest market (see Figure   1 .1). It ranked among the top two exporters and importers of both goods and services (see In part because of its economic importance, the EU has become a major player in the global governance of international trade. By the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the late 1970s the EU was firmly established as a "veto player" within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Paemen and Bensch 1995: 29-30; Smith and Woolcock 1999: 442; Wolf 1983: 151) . By the mid-1980s it had emerged as an almost equal partner with the US in shaping global governance of trade. Transatlantic cooperation was necessary and largely sufficient for concluding the Uruguay Round (Evenett 2007: 143; Peterson 2004; Smith and Woolcock 1999: 442) .
In the immediate wake of the Uruguay Round the EU began to show greater ambition, first in the basic telecommunications and financial services negotiations that were relaunched after the WTO was established (Hoekman and Kostecki 2001: 259; Young 2002: 74-5) . The EU emerged as the true pace setter in multilateral trade negotiations in the latter half of the 1990s, pushing for a comprehensive "millennium round" at the unsuccessful 1999 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle. Subsequently, it became the principal champion of extending the rule-based multilateral trading system (Baldwin 2006: 933) As a number of these agreements (for instance with CARIFORUM) and negotiations (such as with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Mercosur and the on-going economic partnership agreements with former colonies of EU member states) involve multiple countries, so the country coverage of these agreements is much greater than the number of agreements. In short, the EU"s role in shaping the multilateral rules governing trade and in developing a network of bilateral and inter-regional agreements means that it has had significant impact on the rules shaping international trade.
What might be termed the EU"s "unilateral" trade policies also have a powerful impact on the conduct of global trade. It has numerous unilateral policies -such as the Everything But Arms initiative and GSP+ -that give products from countries that meet certain criteria preferential access to the EU"s market (see Chapter 5). As a result of such unilateral policies as well its numerous bilateral agreements, only a handful of countries do not enjoy preferential access to the EU"s market. The EU"s public health and environmental policies, however, tend to restrict access to the EU"s markets and create incentives for foreign producers to adapt their practices to meet EU requirements and sometimes even to push for domestic changes to match EU rules (Damro 2010: 19; Vogel 1995) . The EU is also a leading user of anti-dumping duties to exclude products being sold in the EU at an "unfair" price. 7 The EU"s economic importance and status as a trade power thus are products of both its intentional and unintentional efforts to shape the rules.
Unexplained tensions in EU trade policy
Despite the importance to the global economy of the Union"s policies and advocacy, EU trade policy making is actually very poorly understood. This gap in our knowledge is largely due to the tendency of scholars to focus overwhelmingly only a few trading relationships;
particularly within the multilateral trading system and with the former colonies of the member states and with the US (for a review, see Young2011). Consequently, a large number of unexplained tensions (if not contradictions) characterize the EU"s trade policy.
First and foremost among them is whether the EU"s trade policy is liberal or protectionist, with the EU being variously characterized as liberal (Brülhart and Matthews 2007: 484; Hanson, 1998 , Jonquieres 1996 , "nominally liberal" (Winters 2001: 25) , protectionist (Messerlin 2001; Schuknecht 1992: 193) , or an "incidental fortress" (Young 2004 ). To a significant extent these characterizations reflect attention to only partial different aspects of EU trade policy or specific policy cases. Portraits of the EU"s trade policy as liberal focus on its overall openness to trade (being the world"s largest importer); its low average tariffs on all but a few manufactured goods; 8 its few quantitative restrictions perhaps puzzle, is why the EU, given its extensive economic resources, has been relatively ineffective in shaping multilateral trade rules and influencing the behaviour of others, particularly emerging economic states (refs needed). Our explanation for these tensions is that the policies in question arise out of distinct policy sub-systems, each with its own political dynamic. It is thus not surprising that the policy out-turns from these policy subsystems should be different and that, consequently, there should be tensions, if not outright conflict between and among them.
The Centrality of Trade Policy to the EU
The flip-side of the importance of the EU to international trade is the importance of trade policy for the EU. Trade policy is one of the most established areas of cooperation in the EU.
It is an area where the EU wields unusually "hard competence" according to the Union"s 9 Some scholars, particularly Messerlin, but also Winters, express concern about the trade diverting affect of the EU"s many preferential agreements (Messerlin, Winters) treaties. It is also arguably one of the most important dimensions for defining how the EU is understood. Trade policy represents a pivotal decision on integration. It is a crucial interface between the citizens of Europe and the processes of economic globalization. The EU"s economic capacity, which trade policy seeks to harness, is central to depictions of the EU as a global actor. In addition, trade policy is a highly revealing testing ground for the EU"s commitment to "effective multilateralism". In short, it is one of the EU"s most potentially potent foreign policy instruments.
Trade as a constitutive policy
In many respects trade policy is a constitutive policy of the EU. A central decision in the Hine (1985: 2) does not hesitate to describe the customs union as the "foundation" of the EU"s cooperative activities.
Trade policy and globalization
Because trade policy regulates the conditions on which goods and services can enter the EU"s market, it is a crucial interface between the European and global economies (Jacoby and Meunier 2010: 302) . This view was reflected in a 2007 Harris poll, which found sizable majorities in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK agreeing that the EU should do more to protect European citizens from the adverse effects of globalization. 10 At the same time, pluralities of European respondents agreed that the EU helped to protect them from the negative effects of globalization (44 percent) and enabled them to benefit from the positive results of globalization (48 percent) (Eurobarometer 2008: 39) . That the people of Europe judge the EU in part on its ability to deliver economic prosperity is one of the central premises As we have outlined, the EU certainly has significant economic power, and, according to Michael Smith (2007: 528) , the EU "can claim with some justification to be a major trade power in the [international political economy]" (see also Dür and Zimmerman 2007: 772; Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006: 908) . This view is rooted in the size of the EU"s market and its importance in world trade, as well as its activism in multilateral trade negotiations and pursuit of bilateral trade agreements. In particular, a large market is seen as a source of power because access to such a market is highly valued. 11 Polities with larger markets, therefore, enjoy benefit from "asymmetric interdependence" (Keohane and Nye 2001: 9) in multilateral trade negotiations (Barton et al 2006: 10-11 ). Moreover, granting or denying access to a market as large as that of the EU can be a powerful source of influence (Hirschman 1980) . 
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We contend that the ability of any international actor to translate power resources into outcomes is "relational," reflecting the aims sought, the utility (arguably legitimacy) of specific power resources with respect to that objective, and the preferences and power of the other engaged parties ( . While never really defining effective multilateralism, the ESS implies that it requires "a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order". 14 Elgström et al (2007: 4) ask whether the "word "effective" is more than a rhetorical device". If it is, does effectiveness apply to the international institution to which the Union"s efforts are applied in general (that it achieves the ends for which it was created) or to the advancement of the EU"s collective interests through it? The ESS echoes this ambiguity. It rehearses the desire for international institutions to be effective (European Council 2003: 9) , but also states, "We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors" (p. 13 emphasis added).
Trade policy is a particularly apt vehicle for unpacking the significance of the EU"s commitment to "effective multilateralism." First, the ESS repeatedly highlights the importance of trade policy in pursuing effective multilateralism. For example, the WTO appears first on a list of "key institutions in the international system" (even before the United Nations) in the Strategy"s section on "strengthening the international order" (p. 9). The WTO is then singled out (along with the International Criminal Court) as an international institution that the EU has "an interest in further developing" (p. 10). Second, as discussed above, trade policy is the aspect of external relations in which the EU is assumed to be most effective, because the policy is highly institutionalized and the EU has substantial market power (Damro 2010) . Third, the ESS sees trade (and development) policies as "powerful tools for promoting reform" in developing countries, particularly through encouraging good governance and respect for human rights (p. 10), and "[a] world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens" (p. 10).
By contrast, a number of authors (Hyde-Price 2006; K. E. Smith 2003; M. Smith 2009: 104) have noted that the EU"s advocacy of norms, such as human rights and democracy, has given way when it has clashed with the pursuit of its economic interests. Fourth, trade policy is an area in which the effectiveness of multilateral institutions is not always comfortable for the EU. In particular, the problems the EU has experienced complying with its multilateral trade obligations in a number of high profile disputes have prompted criticism of the EU"s commitment to international law and effective multilateralism (Bronkers 2008: 893; Goldsmith and Posner 2008; Hine 1985: 256; Hudec 1993: 314; M. Smith 2007: 530; Patterson 1983: 223; Pollack 2003; Teese 1982: 44; Wolf 1983: 163) . Trade policy thus is both a dimension of external relations in which the EU is expected to be particularly effective and one where its capacity for and commitment to effective multilateralism are called into question.
We use trade policy in this volume as a prism through which to view the EU"s commitment to effective multilateralism. We find, first, that close analysis of specific EU trade initiatives -such as the transition from the Lomé Convention to the Cotonou Agreement, the Union"s FTA with South Africa, or the economic component of the New
Transatlantic Agenda with the US -make the EU vulnerable to the charge that it is committed to effective multilateralism in rhetoric only. Second, we also find that whether the Union"s actions actually result in stronger international rule of law and equality among states very much depends on the policy sub-system in which EU policy is made. Third, we argue that in trade policy, as elsewhere, the very notion of "effective multilateralism" remains amorphous and under-specified. Before the EU can be said to be its champion, the Union"s member states and institutions first need to come to a consensus about what it really means (see Lazarou et al 2010) .
Trade policy as foreign policy
As we have noted, trade policy is one of the EU"s most potent foreign policy tools; what Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006: 907) 
What is trade policy?
The preceding discussion has given some sense of what trade policy is, but further specification is needed. For our purposes, trade policy encompasses all of those public policies that affect the passage of goods and services across borders: tariffs, quantitative restrictions, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, trade disputes, and regulatory barriers to trade, and includes trade restrictions imposed or concessions granted for foreign policy purposes (see Box 1.1). These policies may be pursued through multilateral or bilateral negotiations or imposed unilaterally. Our argument is that each of these different trade policies is characterized by a different political dynamic and so constitutes a distinct policy "sub system."
Box 1.1 brief explanations of key trade policy instruments
Our definition of trade policy is broader than that commonly found in most works within the international political economy literature that focus on trade. Overwhelmingly, most focus on tariffs (Milner 2002 : 449, Lake 2006 . 15 We also embrace a broader understanding than is commonly found in the EU trade policy literature, which tends to focus on multilateral trade negotiations and particular bilateral trading relationships (see Young   2011 ). This broader focus is warranted because non-tariff barriers to trade -anti-dumping duties and regulatory barriers -are arguably the most significant policies affecting access of goods and services to the EU"s market (ECORYS 2009: xiii; Messerlin 2001; USTR 2001; .
Our focus, however, is narrower than the EU"s "economic power," which is central to many depictions of the EU as a global actor. These broader depictions tend to include (albeit usually only in passing) development assistance, the euro and sometimes competition policy in addition to trade policy. These policy areas and their instruments may indirectly, but do not directly affect the passage of goods and services across the EU"s borders. 16 Our definition also excludes the regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI), which prior to the Treaty of Lisbon was primarily a member state competence. 17 If we were writing this book, say, 10
years from now in the early 2020s, FDI might be a central focus. But we have excluded itas well as the other policy areas noted above -from our analysis to sharpen its focus on the EU"s trade power, as opposed to its wider "market power" (Damro 2010 ).
Our argument
Chapter 2 develops our approach, which is grounded firmly in the "open economy politics" approach to international political economy. It thus focuses on the interaction between three key factors (Lake 2006: 762) :
1) the societal context, and how economic actors engage in the policy process in response to the anticipated costs and benefits of trade policy (see Wolf 2008) , and particularly how these demands are mediated through the EU"s member states;
2) the intra-EU institutional context, especially the delegation of trade policy authority and the decision rules that apply to the adoption of trade policy decisions;
3) the external context, particularly whether the EU is pursuing unilateral or reciprocal policies and whether the distribution of power is symmetrical or asymmetrical.
While these building blocks are common in trade policy analysis, our approach is distinctive in two ways. First, we fully integrate the international context, thus making the 16 The exchange rate between the euro and other currencies obviously has implications for trade, but the euro exchange rate is in effect a side-effect of interest rate decisions taken for other reasons, notably controlling inflation (McNamara and Meunier 2002) . 17 The Commission advanced initial proposals for developing a "comprehensive European international investment policy" in July 2010 (Commission 2010-343) , but this step was recognised as only a preliminary step (p. 2).
interaction among all three elements central to our analysis. Our focus on this interaction sets our approach apart from that found in most of the IPE literature on trade (Lake 2006: 767) as well as most work on EU trade policy (Young 2011) . Second, and more significantly, rather than treating trade policy as a single policy system, we explicitly recognize that the values of our three key factors differ across varying aspects of trade policy. As a result, each aspect of trade policy is appropriately conceptualized as a policy sub-system characterized by a distinctive pattern of political interaction.
This policy sub-systems approach has echoes both in the IPE analysis of trade (see Ikenberry 1988: 238; 240) and in the literature on European foreign policy (see, for instance, Carlsnaes 2007: 546; White 2001: 24) . Ikenberry refers to issue areas rather than policy systems, but he argues for the need to look at the political dynamics of specific trade policy issues, not just trade policy as a whole. Ikenberry"s key distinction between trade policy issues is the "public content" of a policy -whether it concerns a public or private good --which overlaps to an extent with our emphasis on the distribution of anticipated costs and benefits. The literature on European foreign policy, meanwhile, usually treats trade policy as part of the "Community" foreign policy sub-system of the European policy system (see, for instance, Carlsnaes 2007: 546; White 2001: 24) . White (2001: 40) identifies six "elements" that constitute a foreign policy system: actors, processes, issues, instruments, context and outputs, which has resonance with the factors that vary considerably across our different subsystems. Our approach is somewhat simpler than White"s, however, in part because we are focusing on only one policy domain, thus instruments are broadly constant and drop out of the analysis. In addition, we see issues, particularly the anticipated distribution of costs and benefits, as motivating the actors. Moreover, we see the policy process as heavily influenced by the internal context, which in turn is in part a product of the issue in question. Outputs are the product of the sub-system and so are not part of our definition of it.
Outline of the volume
In the next chapter we develop our approach in an explicitly comparative framework.
Drawing extensively on the wider IPE literature on trade policy and particularly on the practice of US trade policy we set out how each of the factors that characterize a policy subsystem varies across different trade policies within the EU. In doing so, this chapter introduces the EU"s key trade policy actors and institutions. The chapter concludes by summarizing our framework and relating it to our policy chapters (4-8).
In chapter 3 we chart the institutional and political development of EU trade policy. Chapter 4 revisits the principal focus of much of the EU trade policy literature: that is, negotiations within the multilateral trading system. While our account is in many respects familiar, it is distinctive in two key ways. First, rather than focusing on a single multilateral trade round, typically the Uruguay Round or (even more commonly) the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), we consider the EU"s participation in multilateral trade negotiations from the origins of what is now the EU through the stuttering DDA. Second, we put reciprocity at the very centre of our analysis. Because of the reciprocal nature of multilateral trade negotiations, it is here that the interaction between rival protectionist and export-oriented interests come into play. It is thus here that the increasing liberalization of EU manufacturing interests (discussed in Chapter 3) has the greatest impact on the substance of policy. The reciprocal nature of the negotiations also means that the increasing importance and assertiveness of Brazil, India, and, to a lesser extent, China from the mid-1990s has a clear impact on the ability of the EU to realize its negotiating objectives. This chapter also discusses the interaction between trade and the EU"s common agricultural policy (CAP).
Here the CAP is presented as a sub-system within a trade sub-system, but one that is being more closely integrated into the multilateral trade sub-system. This chapter thus depicts the EU as a becoming increasingly liberal and proactive within the multilateral trading system, but also as having increasing difficulty securing its objectives.
In chapter 5 we contrast two policies designed to address "unfair" trade practicesanti-dumping and market access barriers. Superficially these two policy sub-systems seem very similar. Both are, for all intents and purposes, unilateral policies and both are characterized by very high degrees of delegation to the Commission and one-sided interest group mobilization. The mobilized societal actors are different, however, and demand different policy outcomes: protectionism and foreign market opening. Because societal politics are one-sided in this policy sub-system and the institutions of delegation favour the demandeurs of action, the EU is active both in imposing anti-dumping duties and in prosecuting foreign market access barriers.
Chapter 6 presents the political dynamics of the single European market, focusing on the implications of internal "trading up" in public health and environmental regulations for third-country firms. This policy sub-system has more in common with domestic regulatory policy-making than international trade policy-making. This chapter, however, also analyses what happens when internal EU regulatory policy explicitly clashes with trade policy by considering how EU policies, and the politics underpinning them, have changed in the wake of adverse rulings by the WTO"s Dispute Settlement Body . It demonstrates that the domestic, regulatory politics sub-system is only slightly affected by the intrusion of trade policy imperatives.
Chapter 7 maintains the focus on regulatory barriers to trade, but prioritises the EU"s engagement in international efforts to manage their adverse effects on trade. In this context it considers how regulatory barriers to trade can be overcome and examines the EU"s efforts to export its regulatory experience. It analyzes in detail the transatlantic efforts to manage the trade effects of regulatory barriers to trade as these are the most intense and advanced international efforts to do so. Echoing Chapter 5, this chapter finds that efforts to mitigate the adverse trade effects of regulatory barriers are significantly hampered by the resistance of domestic, regulatory policy sub-systems to trade considerations. This finding applies to both sides of the Atlantic.
In chapter 8 our focus shifts to trade policy as means of realizing non-economic objectives. It thus surveys the EU"s different foreign policy objectives and the trade policy instruments it deploys to in order to try to realize them. In particular, it considers the EU"s efforts to promote development through Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the Everything But Arms (EBA); and to promote domestic policy reforms through conditionality, GSP+ and the imposition of sanctions. The EU"s efforts to encourage South Africa to embrace multi-party democracy with a free trade agreement after the end of apartheid, isolate
Iran economically amidst efforts to prevent it becoming a nuclear power, and provide assistance to Pakistan after the 2010 floods through unilateral trade liberalization offer vivid case studies. This chapter argues that while non-economic objectives may motivate policy initiatives, the political dynamics of the policy sub-system associated with the trade instrument used tend to deflect the thrust of the policy.
In chapter 9 we conclude by highlighting how the different trade policy sub-systems produce distinctive policy out-turns. We then reflect on the implications of this analysis for the EU"s capacity to act strategically and to be an effective global actor. In addition, we consider the implications of treating trade policy as composed of multiple policy sub-systems for the broader IPE literature on trade policy. What do these policy sub-systems look like?
We let our case studies and empirical evidence answer this question, and summarise our answer as a last element of our analysis.
